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 Are acquisitions a poison pill
 for innovation?
 Michael A. Hitt, Texas A&M University
 Robert E. Hoskisson, Texas A&M University
 R. Duane Ireland, Baylor University
 Jeffrey S. Harrison, Clemson University
 Executive Overview The recent wave of acquisition activity may be damaging the innovative
 capabilities of American firms, thus making them less competitive in the global
 marketplace. In fact, acquisitions often serve as a substitute for innovation,
 which may cause further neglect of internal research and development (R&D)
 programs. Additionally. acquisitions often lead to increases in leverage,
 diversification, and absorb significant amounts of executive time, which may
 lead to reduced managerial commitment to innovation.
 In this article, evidence is presented suggesting that acquisition activity may
 result in reductions in R&D inputs and outputs. On average, the 191 firms in the
 sample reduced their allocations to R&D relative to their competitors following
 acquisitions. Furthermore, the firms also experienced reductions in the number
 of patents.
 Implications from this evidence are offered for executives and acquisition
 strategies. Specifically, based on our results, we propose that firms can
 compensate for the negative effects of acquisitions. Moreover, acquisitions,
 when properly planned and targeted, may enhance or complement a firm's
 innovation processes. Firms should search for acquisitions that complement R&D
 projects, facilitate product commercialization and/or enhance their core
 competences.
 .............................................................................................................................................................................
 Article The David Sarnoff Research Center produced many innovations for RCA. One of
 the Center's widely recognized innovations, the electron gun, is used as a receiver
 for the color system found in most televisions sets in the United States. In 1988, the
 Center discharged 300 employees, reducing its staff by twenty-five percent. The
 reduction occurred at the time GE transferred ownership of the Center to SRI
 International, a nonprofit organization (GE acquired the Center as a part of its $6.4
 billion acquisition of RCA). NBC, a division of RCA, had the largest market share
 of viewers in 1986 when it was acquired by GE. NBC, however, failed to produce
 any major hit shows in 1989 and 1990. As a result, its ratings were down twelve
 percent and its operating profit fell twenty-seven percent in 1990 (and are expected
 to fall a similar amount in 1991).
 NBC's loss of market share and the virtual give away of the acclaimed Sarnoff
 Research Center are symptomatic of deeper problems within GE. Michael Porter
 of Harvard suggested that GE's strategy leads managers to focus on size rather
 than building competitive advantage. Tom Peters argued that the strategy also
 stifles creativity alnd noted that GE hasn't created a new business in decades.'1
 Unfortunately, these symptoms are common in too many U.S. businesses. In fact,
 a recent special report by Business Week stated,
 "For nearly two decades the world's strongest economy has experienced a
 market decline in its share of global output and an insidious decline in its living
 22
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 standard . . . It has been apparent, each time we return to the subject of
 competitiveness, that much needs to be done. Yet, Americans have failed to act."2
 Why have American firms lost much of the competitive advantage they once
 enjoyed? The answer is not simple. However, one prominent reason may be the
 lack of innovation relative to global competitors. International competition has
 awakened us to the fact that the United States is losing its innovativeness.3
 The solution to the U.S. competitiveness problem seems simple-innovate more.
 The answer, however, is probably quite complex. For example, some have
 argued that part of the problem stems from U.S. executives' fascination with and
 emphasis on mergers and acquisitions. One fact is clear-U.S. firms have been
 highly attracted to acquisitive growth in recent years. In fact, the number of
 acquisitions has grown successively for the last three decades.
 The evidence suggests that the value added by acquisitions is, at best,
 controversial. Research shows that the target (or acquired) firm shareholders gain
 value from the acquisition. In contrast, the value of acquisitions for acquiring firm
 shareholders' varies closely around zero. It is not uncommon for acquired firms to
 be divested in the years following an acquisition. A recent study found that almost
 one-third of the acquired firms are eventually divested, suggesting that a number
 of acquisitions may not perform well. Of course, there are many potential reasons.
 For example, the original acquisition price paid may have been excessive. Also,
 the newly acquired firm may be poorly integrated into the acquiring firm or
 ineffectively managed after the acquisition.
 One problem often cited in conjunction with ineffective management of acquired
 firms is the unwillingness (inability) to invest adequate resources to continue
 their growth and development. Dennis Maxwell, vice president of SRI
 International, claimed that one result of the frenzied pace of acquisitions has
 been less in-house R&D being conducted by acquiring companies. Kenneth
 Flamm, an economist for the Brookings Institution, argued that acquisitions and
 other types of restructuring have focused executives' attention on short-term
 returns which contributed to a reduction of basic research.
 In 1988, approximately 3 percent of R&D expenditures were allocated to basic
 research, down from 5.4 percent in 1979. In fact, total R&D expenditures may also
 be reduced. For example, in 1988, GE reduced total R&D expenditures by $300
 million from 1987.
 John Young, president of Hewlett Packard Co., suggested that reductions in R&D
 are harming U.S. firms' competitiveness. He noted that R&D investment as a
 percent of U.S. GNP is significantly below that in West Germany and Japan. He
 also argued that U.S. firms must increase R&D investments to "play in this
 league. "4
 The reduction of investments in basic research and in total R&D outlays may lead
 to fewer innovations. While this is a critically important issue, there has been little
 definitive empirical research examining the effects of acquisitions on R&D
 investments and outputs. Accordingly, we conducted a study to examine the
 effects of acquisitions on R&D investments and outputs.
 The Study
 Our study examines the effects of acquisitions on R&D intensity (R&D divided by
 firm sales) as a measure of R&D inputs and patent intensity (the number of patents
 divided by firm sales) as a measure of R&D outputs. Data were collected on 191
 23
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 acquisitions completed between 1970 and 1986. Firms from twenty-nine separate
 industries were included in our sample. We collected data on the acquiring and
 target firms for three years prior to the merger and for three years after the year in
 which the merger was completed (seven-year span).5 The influence of several
 variables that may affect R&D intensity and patent intensity (e.g., average
 industry R&D intensity, return on assets, diversification of the acquiring firm,
 leverage, firm size, and liquidity) were controlled.
 The Findings
 After acquisitions, we found that R&D intensity increases slightly but not
 significantly (that is, the change is not statistically significant). However, the slight
 increases were due primarily to overall growth in R&D expenditures in the
 acquiring and target firms' industries. The combined average R&D intensity of the
 acquiring and target firms is close to the industry average three years prior to the
 acquisition. However, the gap grows as the year of acquisition is approached and
 continues to grow larger after the acquisition. The difference between firm and
 industry R&D intensity is shown more clearly in Exhibit 1. As shown in this exhibit,
 the difference increases between three years and one year prior to the acquisition
 but then levels off. However, the gap increases in each of the second and third
 years after the acquisition. Therefore, acquiring firms invest less in R&D than their
 competitors and the gap widens after the acquisition is consummated.
 0.000 - __l
 -0.002
 0)
 E -0.004
 -0.01
 -0.01,1
 -4 -2 0 2 4
 Years Before and After Acquisition
 Difference between pre- & post-acquisition observations is statistically significant at p<c.Ol1
 | Exhibit I. Difference Between Firm and Industry R&D Intensity Before and After Acquisition'
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 Some have discounted R&D spending as a robust measure of R&D effectiveness or
 innovation. Stating this somewhat differently, resources can be wasted in R&D
 labs, just as in other parts of the organization, and therefore, "more R&D is never
 a substitute for better R&D." Larger firms (e.g., those created by mergers) enjoy
 scale economies through which they can operate more efficiently (i.e., larger firms
 have the ability to produce greater outputs with the same or fewer resources).6
 Therefore, it is important to examine the outcomes from R&D before and after
 acquisitions. Our measure of R&D outputs was patent intensity (number of patents
 divided by total sales revenue).
 Our findings are depicted in Exhibit 2. As shown, the combined number of patents
 (relative to size of the firm) for the acquiring and target firms increases in two of
 the three years before the acquisition. In fact, the average annual change in
 patents is + 1.69 prior to the acquisition. However, there is a dramatic reduction in
 patent intensity in the first year after the acquisition (leveling off for the next two
 years). The average annual change in patents is - 1.88 after the acquisition. In
 addition, we found the reductions in the number of patents to be particularly acute
 in diversifying acquisitions (where target and acquiring firms are in industries
 unrelated to each other). Clearly, these results do not support the notion that
 acquisitions yield efficiencies in R&D.
 0.032
 0.03
 0.02
 0.0261 /
 0.022\
 0.026
 0.018
 -4 -2 0 2 4
 Years Before and After Acquisition
 Difference between pre- & post-acquisition observations is statistically significant at p<.O1
 L ~~~~~Exhibit 2. Patent Intensity Before and After Acquisition1
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 These findings also likely underestimate the effects of acquisitions because firm
 size, diversification, leverage, liquidity, and profitability have also been argued to
 affect investments in R&D.7 The amount of leverage (Exhibit 3) increased
 dramatically the year of the acquisition and increased again in the second year
 after the acquisition. In the third year after the acquisition, the amount of leverage
 decreased to approximately pre-acquisition levels. Firms likely paid off the debt
 from operating funds. Exhibit 4 shows dramatic effects of acquisitions on
 profitability. Return on assets are significantly lower in the post-acquisition
 compared to pre-acquisition period. Liquidity also declines significantly after
 acquisitions.
 Explanation for the Effects of Acquisitions on Innovation
 Investments in R&D
 At least three reasons may explain a potential negative effect of acquisitions on
 R&D investment. First, managers may prefer to pursue acquisitions in lieu of
 allocating what are typically significant amounts of resources that are required to
 0.55
 0.50
 &r 0.45
 0.40
 0.35II
 .4 -2 0 2 4
 Years Before and After Acquisition
 Difference between pre-and post acquisition observations is ngj statistically
 significant (because of large reduction of leverage in the third year after the
 acquisition).
 Exhibit 3. Financial Leverage Before and After Acquisition'
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 Difference between pre- and post- acquisition observations is statistically
 significant at p<.Ol1.
 l ~~~~~~Exhibit 4. Profitability Before and After Acquisition'
 develop product innovations through internal operations. The fact that acquisitions
 offer immediate entrance to a new market and/or a larger share of a market
 served currently by the firm may be attractive to managers. Furthermore, because
 of resource constraints, either acquisitions or internally-based product
 innovations-but rarely both-tend to be emphasized in most firms. DuPont & Co.
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 products may be easier than with internally based product innovations. In fact, it
 has been argued that acquisitions are a common means used to avoid risky R&D
 expenditures and outcomes.9 Two examples are shown in the acquisitions of Kraft
 and RJR Nabisco. Prior to the Philip Morris acquisition of Kraft, experts predicted
 that it would mean more retreads of current products in multiple varieties (e.g.,
 "new and improved" versions) based on actions following its General Foods
 acquisition. Product line extensions are the least risky way for Philip Morris to
 attempt to dominate shelf space in the retail food outlets. Executives at Philip
 Morris apparently prefer to let other firms take the risk.
 After RJR Nabisco's leveraged buyout by Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts, Nabisco
 Brand's business grew by forty percent and RJR's operating income increased by
 thirty-one percent. However, Nabisco also aggressively reduced costs by firing
 high-paid research engineers and through cutbacks in marketing expenditures.
 Therefore, profits were increased at the possible expense of future growth and
 profits. 10
 Decisions to emphasize acquisitions and/or deemphasize research may be subject
 to increased managerial commitment. As managers complete acquisitions, their
 commitment to this approach may increase over time. One factor that could
 stimulate greater commitment is reduction in R&D competency resulting from
 longitudinal decreases in the resource allocations to R&D. For example, the
 donation of the Sarnoff Research Center to SRI by GE significantly reduced its
 capability to produce innovations in television product lines.
 A second possible explanation for a negative effect of acquisitions on investments
 in R&D relates to the additional levels of debt that firms absorb to complete
 acquisitions. Lack of internal capital or access to increased equity capital forces
 firms to use additional debt. However, greater amounts of debt increase financial
 risk. Managers are constrained by this risk to use cash flows to cover increased
 interest expenses and to repay portions of the debt. These allocations of available
 cash are necessary to maintain credit ratings and credibility with the capital
 markets.
 Also associated with additional debt are stricter operational constraints imposed
 by creditors. These constraints result in more conservative managerial investment
 strategies. Such conservative strategies may explain, at least in part, a reported
 negative relationship between increased debt levels and R&D allocations.
 A number of prominent finance scholars have argued that use of debt can and
 should be quite positive. First, they suggest that debt serves as a disciplining
 force on managers causing them to be more efficient. Second, debt costs transfer
 funds from firms that are inefficient to bondholders who allocate them to other
 firms that will use them more efficiently. Unfortunately, heavy debt costs often
 force managers to substitute payments of these costs not from inefficient uses but
 rather from investments that can be postponed without immediate negative
 outcomes (e.g., R&D). Furthermore, managers requiring debt for discipline to
 produce efficiency should be replaced by more effective managers.
 Taken to an extreme, excess debt can destroy a company. For example, in 1985,
 Fruehauf Corp. was the market leader in truck trailer manufacturing. However,
 according to Joseph White, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, in 1989,
 "Fruehauf once the General Motors of truck trailers is a jackknifed wreck." The
 firm was losing $1 million per week and could not meet its $101 million per year
 debt payments. As a result, the firm's assets were carved up and sold off. The
 Southland Corporation faced a similar situation when it took on a huge debt load
 28
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 to finance an LBO to abort a takeover attempt. Eventually, to pay debt costs
 Southland had to sell off assets from its highly profitable 7-11 division and accept a
 majority partner from Japan. Additionally, Integrated Resources Inc. defaulted on
 its debt of $2 billion in high yield junk bonds.11 The point is that debt has its risks.
 Obviously, none of the executives in these three firms were concerned about
 innovation; rather, they were concerned about their firm's survival.
 A third reason that acquisitions may negatively affect R&D investments concerns
 the substantial amounts of senior executives' time and energy required to first
 negotiate and then complete acquisitions. Acquisitions often require extensive
 preparations and sometimes laborious negotiations, particularly in unfriendly
 acquisitions. Firms actively pursuing acquisitions conduct searches for viable
 target firms. Typically, these searches are completed through sophisticated data
 gathering techniques and analytical processes. The breadth and depth of the
 reports and recommendations submitted to top level executives for their evaluation
 and action typically absorb extensive amounts of managerial time.
 Even friendly acquisitions require agreement among the parties on a range of
 meticulous details. As a result, the identification, selection of, and negotiations
 with potential acquisition targets require top executives to process significant
 quantities of disparate information. Because of information overload, managers
 may choose to delegate other critical decisions and operational matters.
 Nonetheless, top level managers must still make major resource allocation
 decisions. Managers' information constraints accentuate the riskiness of internal
 development.
 These problems are not limited to executives of the acquiring firm. Often, target
 firm managers become absorbed in negotiating the deal or in fighting the
 takeover attempt. Additionally, other managers in the target firm sometimes
 operate as if in a state of suspended animation. They continue current operations
 but without making long-term plans or investments (unless done to make the firm
 unattractive as a takeover target). Takeover attempts often distract the attention of
 target firm managers. For example, they may react as did RJR managers just prior
 to the KKR financed leveraged buyout. An article in the Wall Street Journal
 reported that many of the managers were angry and spent time swapping rumors
 about the potential effects of an LBO. For example, many were fearful of losing
 their jobs in cost reduction moves and as a result, were on the job market in
 anticipation of potential cutbacks. 12 Thus, time and energy absorption, combined
 with managerial risk aversion, may result in lower resource allocations to R&D.
 In total, the evidence suggests that an emphasis on acquisitive growth may result
 in risk-averse managerial mindsets. In turn, such mindsets may cause managers
 to reduce their commitments to innovation. This commitment, defined as a
 managerial willingness to allocate resources and champion activities that lead to
 the development of new products, technologies, and processes consistent with
 marketplace opportunities, may be critical to internal product development
 activities.
 Outcomes from R&D Investments
 The relative degree of managerial commitment to innovation may be reflected by
 the amount of resources invested in R&D and by the number of outputs (such as
 patents) achieved through these investments. Because patents indicate an
 intention to commercialize a product, they serve as a meaningful measure of R&D
 outputs. Thus, regardless of the resources invested, the R&D process must be
 managed effectively if desired successes are to be attained. In addition, ideas
 must be appropriately championed if they are to be developed into patentable
 products and/or processes. 13
 Unfortunately, an acquisition may negatively affect a firm's championing culture.
 For example, if top executives become less committed to innovation, they will offer
 29
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 fewer rewards and/or incentives to those desiring to create and champion
 internally based product innovations. In turn, lower level managers become less
 interested in expending efforts required for the development of product or process
 ideas that lead to patents. As a result, the transfer of new product ideas to
 marketable products is less likely to occur.
 The problems of managing and commercializing product innovations are
 exacerbated in diversifying acquisitions. In his latest book, Alfred Chandler, noted
 business historian, argued that diversification into new product markets became
 an accepted and preferred means of corporate growth in America. These firms
 diversified early based on products from their own research laboratories.
 However, as more firms invested in R&D, the development of innovative products
 became more expensive and risky. As competition grew more intense, firms
 began to invest in acquiring businesses unrelated to their current markets rather
 than investing more in R&D and other developmental functions. As a result,
 Chandler concluded that these firms lost their competitive advantage. Managers
 were overseeing businesses they did not understand and thus could not manage
 effectively. Because they lacked appropriate understanding of the businesses,
 financial controls (focused on short-term oriented and risk-averse financial
 outcomes) became the norm for management of diversified firms (as opposed to
 longer-term strategic controls). 14 Ineffective management and the use of financially
 based outcome controls caused managers to become less interested in developing
 and championing new products (because of the risk and potential return only in
 the long term). As a result, there was a reduction in commitment to innovation
 and commercializing it. This may explain why we found lower patent intensity
 after diversifying acquisitions.
 .............................................................................................................................................................................
 General Signal exemplifies the inability to manage diversification effectively. In
 the 1980's, General Signal went on a diversification binge that included a foray
 into glamorous but treacherous high technology industries (such as
 semi-conductor equipment). The strategy produced a firm of forty-four
 businesses, many of them unrelated to one another. Because of mountains of red
 ink, a new CEO began selling off assets, more than $200 million to date. He also
 attempted to sell the $130 million telecommunications business but
 unfortunately, no buyers were found. To date, the divestments have yet to turn
 around the firm's profits. Experts predict more sell-offs before the firm becomes
 profitable and manageable.
 More specific effects are shown in the Eastman Kodak Co. acquisition of Sterling
 Drug Co. (for $5.1 billion). Kodak executives felt they could install "Kodak
 management" and turn around the drug company's performance. In particular,
 the "Kodak management" focused on Sterling's R&D operation. However,
 Sterling's problems became more severe after Kodak's acquisition and installation
 of its management team. Its new drugs have not been testing well while, at the
 same time, its current product line faces fierce competition. Kodak managers
 quietly cut projects that were predicted to generate new products for Sterling. As a
 result, debt on the Sterling acquisition exceeded the firm's operating earnings by
 $50 million in 1989. Critics ar?ued that Kodak paid too much for a business that it
 had no expertise to manage. 5
 In summary, based on the available evidence, we expected and found firms
 following an acquisition strategy to invest less in R&D and to produce fewer
 patents.
 Conclusions and Implications
 Some believe the raucous days of mergers and acquisitions are over, but the
 demise of this popular strategy has been predicted previously. Nonetheless, the
 30
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Thu, 11 Jun 2020 11:20:04 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland. and Harrison
 number of mergers and acquisitions has increased with each decade beginning
 with the 1960s. With growing pressures for global competition, new financing
 alternatives and pressures from Wall Street for improved performance, many
 expect the popularity of the acquisitive growth strategy will continue unabated.'6
 While acquisitions are expected to continue, the importance of innovation grows.
 Lessons from history suggest the importance of being a first mover in the market.
 This position is also supported by recent research examining fifteen different
 global industries and found that sales growth was clearly linked with investments
 in R&D. Regardless of the industry, the firms that invested more in R&D had
 greater sales growth during the ten-year period of the study. 17 Innovativeness is
 an important ingredient for global competitiveness.
 The Singer Co.'s demise provides an example of the importance of innovation for
 competitiveness. When Singer executives saw the U.S. sewing market begin to
 shrink, instead of reinvesting profits in continued development of their sewing
 products, they milked profits from this business to finance acquisitions. Eventually,
 the sewing machine division was spun off to SSMC Inc. The 1600 company-owned
 stores were closed (or sold), eliminating a dealer network built during four
 decades. The poor quality of its new machines has severely hurt Singer's ability to
 compete and harmed its reputation. 18
 .............................................................................................................................................................................
 We return to the primary question underlying this research and article, "Are
 acquisitions a poison pill for innovation?" Results from our study suggest that
 acquisitions may well lead to lower innovation. The results clearly show that in
 addition to the effects of debt, diversification, size, profits, and liquidity,
 investments in R&D (relative to competitors), and number of patents decrease
 after acquisitions. Interestingly, the results also show that relative R&D and
 patents are generally decreasing before the acquisitions and continue to
 decrease thereafter. These results reinforce the concern that some of these firms
 are using acquisitions as a substitute for innovation.
 However, it is important to emphasize that not all acquisitions mean a poison pill
 for innovation. In an earlier article, we argued that targeted and well-planned
 acquisitions may well enhance firm innovation, growth, and overall value. Some
 acquisitions may well be used to complement or enhance R&D and innovation.
 For example, firms may acquire a company (often times smaller) with a
 complementary patent, process, product market or other specialized skill/capability
 not possessed by the acquiring firm and necessary to commercialize a product
 idea produced by R&D. Thus, acquisitions may be necessary to commercialize
 internal R&D projects. Therefore, an R&D project may be unsuccessful not
 because of its lack of value, but because the innovation (or acquisition) is
 mismanaged.
 Firms may also acquire companies with new technology. This is particularly
 effective when large firms with developed manufacturing and distribution systems
 acquire smaller firms with developed innovative capacity. In this way, the core
 competences of each firm complement the other (creating synergy). 19
 Some acquisitions seek to capitalize on market power from combining two firms
 R&D capabilities (e.g., in the highly competitive telecommunications or
 pharmaceuticals industries). An example is the merger of Beecham and
 Smithkline (now catlled Smithkline Beecham PLC). Combined, the firm is among
 the top five global drug-makers, with Beecham strong in European markets and
 Smithkline strong in the U.S. They cover more research areas, thereby increasing
 the probability of discovering a blockbuster new drug.20
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 Alfred Chandler noted that history has shown large-scale multinational
 corporations to build competitive advantage by long-term investments in and
 commitment to manufacturing, R&D, and marketing (distribution). As such, they
 built and maintained capabilities to compete in their markets. Thus, acquisitions
 should be aimed at enhancing or maintaining the firm's core competences (i.e.,
 critical skills, capabilities, and knowledge). Likely these acquisitions will entail
 businesses in related, as opposed to unrelated, product markets. ASK Computer
 Systems' acquisition of Ingres Corporation, maker of database software, may
 exemplify this case. The CEO of ASK, Sandra Kurtzig, has taken other bold moves
 such as increasing funds for new products from ten to fifty percent of the R&D
 budget. New products will be based on Ingres' database and will work on most
 computers, broadening ASK's market.21
 Our results suggest that unless acquisitions are well planned and targeted they
 may injure a firm's innovation capabilities. Innovation seems critical for long-term
 global competitiveness. Firms such as Nestle, Corning, and Warner Lambert have
 been innovative and may be well positioned to solidify their position in global
 markets in the 1990s and beyond. While Philip Morris has focused on product line
 extensions in its General Foods and Kraft businesses, Nestle has been investing in
 and developing innovations in nutrition, health foods, and elaborate freshly
 prepared chilled entrees (refrigerated, not frozen). Warner-Lambert has invested
 heavily in R&D and the investments are paying off with two new drugs, Cognex,
 the first drug to treat Alzheimer's disease and Novon, a biodegradable substance
 designed to replace disposable plastic products.
 Corning has built an excellent global network of interrelated businesses that share
 technology and human resources. To do so, Jamie Houghton, the CEO, has
 focused on quality, formed alliances (currently a partner in nineteen joint
 ventures) primarily to enhance or complement technology or marketing
 capabilities, and share technology across businesses (thereby leveraging
 investments). 22
 Our message to executives is that you can follow an acquisition strategy and be
 innovative, but only with careful planning and execution. Based on the results of
 our study, we offer the following guidelines for successful acquisitions and
 innovations:
 (1) Search for target firms that will complement R&D projects and/or enhance your
 firm's core competences.
 (2) Search for innovative target firms whereby the integration with your core
 competences (e.g., manufacturing, marketing) creates synergy.
 (3) Consider joint ventures as alternatives to acquisitions. In some cases joint
 ventures can enhance/complement technology more than acquisitions.
 (4) Share technological advances across businesses within your firm to leverage
 investments.
 (5) Avoid unrelated acquisitions unless there is a high probability of achieving
 other than financial synergy (e.g., enhancing/complementing core
 competences).
 (6) Develop information systems that link R&D with key stakeholders (including
 suppliers, customers, manufacturing, design, and marketing personnel) across
 business units.
 (7) Develop incentives that both foster R&D cooperation as well as encourage
 product championing by key executives.
 (8) Consider the long-term consequences of actions, prior to reducing investments
 in R&D (relative to the industry) and/or lowering commitment to innovation in
 other ways (e.g., reduction of the championing of innovations for
 commercialization).
 Our message to
 executives is that you
 can follow an
 acquisition strategy
 and be innovative,
 but only with careful
 planning and
 execution.
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 The results of our study suggest some important implications for managers to
 maintain the innovative output of their firms and their firms' ability to compete in
 global markets. Our main theme is best summarized by the following quote:
 "Mergers and acquisitions have become an almost routine fact of life in corporate
 America. Preparation for mergers, however, is by no means routine. The quality
 of the effort expended up front may determine the success of the resulting
 merger. "23
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